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Labor Culture: Labor Morality under Socialism
Vladimir Magun
Soviet leaders had always taken a keen interest in workers' behavior and
labor motives and sought to keep labor morality under strict state control.
A complex network of values and regulations was developed for this
purpose after the October Revolution of 1917. They were best articulated
in the "political economy of socialism" which purported to present a
scientific picture of the country's economic life. Textbooks on socialist
economy were widely circulated in the Soviet Union and appropriate
courses included into a core curriculum for all higher education institutions
in the country. Basic tenets of socialist political economy were taught in
introductory social science classes in high schools. Leading educators
helped popularize the subject, while major research centers in the nation
continued to perfect the science of socialist economics. A prominent place
in socialist political economy was given to work ethics, labor motives,
employment opportunities, reward structure and other characteristics
which formed socialist labor culture. In this chapter, I shall examine
socialist labor morality, the relationship between the official Soviet
blueprints and unofficial realities, the changes that socialist labor culture
underwent in recent years, and the emerging trends in labor morality and
work ethics in post-Soviet society.
Work and Employment in the Socialist Ideology
To begin with, all things connected with labor had a special significance in
the state ideology that evolved in Russia after the communists came to
power. The revolution itself was justified by the need to put an end to the
exploitation of labor, to eliminate capitalists who misappropriated the
"surplus value" produced by the proletariat, and to level social and
economic differences separating various classes in society. These tasks
were to be accomplished by rooting out private property, socializing the
means of production, eliminating the class of private entrepreneurs, and
radically restructuring the institution of labor.
The political slogans which propelled the bolsheviks to power sidestepped
the production and labor process proper and focused instead on the
distribution and redistribution of the wealth produced in the prerevolutionary Russia. However, as the new social order began to stabilize,
the communist leaders' attention shifted to production and the need to
motivate workers in their daily labors. Gradually, the Soviet Union

transformed itself into what Hannah Arendt called " "work society" where
"work and labour activity are not only a natural precondition for human
existence, but where work also has a central cultural value and where
work institutions assume a central role in the entire societal structure."
[1] In effect, Soviet ideology surrounded labor with a sacred halo and
pronounced hard work on behalf of the state to be each citizen's sacred
duty. This ideology was inspired by orthodox Marxism, and specifically by
its emphasis on activity, labor-created value, toiling proletariat as an
embodiment of social progress, and the central role that tool-aided
behavior was supposed to have played in the human evolution. [2]
Every able-bodied individual, according to Soviet ideology, had to be
inducted into the labor force: dodging employment and living on unearned
income were condemned. The Soviet constitution faithfully reflected this
precept. Thus the last version of the constitution adopted by the former
Soviet Union read: "It is the duty, as well as the honor, for every ablebodied citizen in the USSR to work conscientiously in his chosen, socially
useful activity, and strictly to observe labor discipline. Evading socially
useful work is incompatible with the principles of socialist society."
[3] Based on this principle, several legal acts were passed by the Supreme
Soviet that criminalized so-called "social parasites" or job shirkers. Among
the more sensational cases stemming from these laws was the conviction
of the poet Joseph Brodsky for parasitism. Brodsky, who would later be
awarded Nobel Price in literature, was exiled to the northern Arkhangelsk
Region where he was to submit to "forced employment." As the basis for
his ruling, the judge cited the May 4, 1961 , resolution passed by the
Presidium of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet that called for
additional measures against those evading public labor. Labor-centrism
came to the fore during the official campaign against "unearned incomes,"
triggered by the special decree on "Combatting Unearned Incomes" that
was issued by the Supreme Soviet in 1986. This decree put a criminal spin
on even those limited forms of independent economic activity that were
hitherto available to Soviet citizens, such as selling produce from the puny
plots owned by the members of collective farms. The decree also cast a
shadow over the inheritance practices, lottery winnings, gifts from
relatives, and other earnings unrelated to a person's work. [4]
Another economic tenet that circumscribed the labor process in Soviet
society concerned the ownership over the production means: land, raw
materials, machinery, labor tools, etc. The socialist political economy
sanctioned two basic forms of ownership: national and
cooperative/collective. In both cases, workers were cast as co-owners with
equal stakes in the production means and work products. As to the private

ownership over the production means and the private entrepreneurship it
engendered, these were pronounced alien to socialism. Engaging in
private enterprise became a criminal activity. As a result, both evading
work (failure to be gainfully employed in an official enterprise) and the
most active form of employment (engaging in a private enterprise)
appeared to be outlawed. The only recognized form of employment was
hired labor for the state, which stood behind every industrial and service
enterprise in the nation, or for the collective farm in agriculture, which
legally constituted a separate form of ownership but in practice did not
differ much from the state owned enterprises.
A closer look at this form of employment suggests that it did not live up to
its official billing. Socialist ideology touted employees as public property
co-owners who worked for nobody else but themselves. An appropriate
quotation from Lenin was usually invoked to justify this point, which said
that "for the first time after centuries of work for others, coercive toil for
the exploiters, the possibility of work for oneself has become a reality."
[5] In fact, socialist workers did not have any say in important economic
decisions -- the functions that normally come with the ownership rights -and thus could hardly be construed as co-owners. [6]
The co-ownership ruse accomplished an important goal: under the
premises of the socialist political economy, the labor force could no longer
be seen as a saleable commodity. This, in turn, allowed the communist
party ideologists to claim that there was no labor market under socialism.
Indeed, how could citizens, who own all property, sell their labor to
themselves? References to "selling" and "purchasing" labor, "price of
labor" and "wage labor," were discarded as inapplicable to the socialist
system. Wherever the words "hire" and "wage labor" would crop up, they
usually appeared in quotation marks and were used with reservations.
Here is a sample of rationalizations designed by the socialist political
economists to buttress this point:
As they together own the means of production, employees cannot sell
their labor force to themselves. [7]
Those who own the production means can't purchase their ability to work
from themselves. [8]
The working class cannot sell its labor power to itself, since it owns the
production means. Consequently, only the outward appearance of hire
survives when it comes to the employees' relation to society through

which they implement their right to work. [9]
Normative Motives and Workers' Attitudes
The ideological constructs presented above go to the heart of socialist
ideology and define in the broadest terms the place that this ideology
accorded to labor in society. In addition to these general principles, the
socialist political economy articulated more specific normative guidelines
pertaining to the goals and motivations of socialist labor. Two instructive
distinctions could be singled out in regard to socialist labor motives and
goals. The first one involved the distinction between personal and public
interests that motivate labor activity. Personal interests included the
worker's own needs, as well as those of his family. Public interests
referred to the well-being of the collective and community as a whole. The
second relevant distinction juxtaposed two types of the worker's interests:
"spiritual" and "material." Spiritual needs were linked to the labor process
itself and were defined as the satisfaction that the worker derives from
work well done, from finding an outlet for one's creativity, from respect
that a hard-working person earns from his co-workers. Material needs had
to do with the remuneration for one's contribution to public production, be
this in the form of salary or non-monetary benefits. This normative
distinction partly coincides with what students of labor call "intrinsic" and
"extrinsic" labor motives, [10] or work as a "value in itself" and as an
"instrumental" activity. [11]
Up to the late-80's, the official Soviet ideology clearly favored public over
private interests and spiritual over material labor motives. The priority
given to public motives perfectly fitted the totalitarian mold of Soviet
society, which subordinated the individual to the state. The disdain for the
worker's personal interests was camouflaged with the notion that public
ownership over production means gave everybody the same stake in the
production process and assured that personal or private interests were in
the end identical with the interests of the community as a whole. After all,
does not every socialist worker toil for himself, even if he is technically a
state employee? Does not he own the product of his labor, even if he
cannot dispose of it personally? And would not he therefore naturally be
inclined to value the manager's directives as his own?
Such were the normative expectations that the Soviet ideologists harbored
about communist work ethics. The actual labor morality among Soviet
workers was another story. Indicative in this respect was the workers'
reaction to the late 20s campaign promoting exemplary labor by individual
workers and work teams. This officially approved initiative aimed at

lowering general pay rates, raising production quotas, speeding work
processes, introducing penalties for substandard performance, etc. The
campaign did not sit well with workers who, as researchers would later
point out, resisted pressure to intensify the labor process. [12] Clearly,
workers were unwilling to sacrifice personal interests to "public good."
Even so-calledudarniki -- exemplary workers routinely overfulfilling their
production quotas -- did not surrender their own and their families'
interests. But whenudarniki complained about low pay rates, they risked
being branded greedy profiteers or shkurniki by trade union bosses who
threatened to disband their work teams. Nor were Soviet peasants thrilled
by the prospects of being herded into collective farms and working for
anybody else but themselves and their families.
Numerous developments attest to the fact that official labor morality and
everyday Soviet reality did not coincide. This would become more evident
in post-Stalinist Russia , when workers would sometimes be driven to
direct actions protesting the official indifference to their basic needs. One
of the most dramatic events of this kind happened in 1962 in the city of
Novocherkask , where the authorities called in the troops to stamp out a
demonstration by workers protesting the hikes in food prices. [13]
The data from sociological surveys point in the same direction. Thus an
important study of workers from 12 industrial enterprises in Leningrad
conducted in 1976 by Dr. Vladimir Yadov and his associates revealed that
between 63 and 73 percent of those polled listed good earnings as the
most valuable quality they are looking for in a job. No more than 6% of
respondents mentioned the opportunity to participate in management
decisions as an important job specification and only 18% singled out a
job's "creative content."
The study of Russian immigrants further corroborate these findings.
[14] Among the factors negatively effecting the Soviet economy, Russian
immigrants, who were polled in the 1970's, listed low earnings, poor
working conditions, the shortage of consumer goods, and bad housing
accommodations -- all the factors pertaining to the workers' personal and
family well-being. Thus, we can argue that material interests, rather than
ideologically inspired spiritual needs, predominated in the Soviet workers'
values since at least the middle-1970's. [15]
Realizing the gap between normative expectations and everyday labor
morality, Soviet ideologists emphasized the transitional nature of socialist
society, which was conceived in Marxism as the initial phase of the
communist socio-economic formation. It is only with the onset of

communism -- the ultimate stage of social evolution -- that the spiritual
labor motives would fully inform labor morality. This is how Lenin
described this historically new type of labor ethics:
Communist labor, in the narrower and stricter sense of the term, is free
labor for society's sake; labor done not as duty, not to win the right to
certain products, not according to pre-set legalized quotas, but voluntary
labor without quotas and without expectations of remuneration; labor as
the custom to work for the common good and as a conscious (and
habitual) realization of the necessity to labor for the common good; labor
as a need of a healthy body. [16]
One could trace this stance taken by Lenin to the well-known passage in
Marx's "Critique of the Gotha Program," which stated that "at the highest
stage of communist society, . . . labor will cease to be solely a means of
living and become in itself a primary necessity of life." [17] Lenin's words
were, in some cases, even stronger. [18]
But this distinction between the two phases of communism -- socialism as
the initial stage of the communist production mode and the ultimate stage
of fully developed communism -- gave to socialist ideologists an inferiority
complex clearly evident in the apologetic tone with which they described
the the motivational dynamics actually observed under socialism.
The Protestant and Communist Labor Ethics
A comparison between communist work ethics and the Protestant
(capitalist) work ethic is clearly in order here. Both the Protestant work
ethic as analyzed by Max Weber in his classic study [19] and Soviet
models of labor morality are distinguished by their emphasis on labor as a
vital sphere of human activity. Both tend to underplay the personal and
family consumption motives as a primary basis for labor activity. The
elevation of spiritual needs over material ones in the Soviet ideology
offers an instructive parallel to the religious motives that propelled early
capitalists in their economic undertakings. In the Soviet case, we also
have tangible evidence that real personal consumption was kept at a
minimum. This can be gleaned from a comparison between the public
consumption and industrial accumulation funds in the Soviet era. During
the early stages of rapid industrialization in the Soviet Union, the relative
weight of consumption funds dwindled while that of accumulation funds
grew from 10-15 to 40-45 percent. In later years, capital accumulation
funds sometimes accounted for more than 60 percent of the national

income in the Soviet Union. [20]
The early capitalist growth in the West revealed some similar cultural
trends, including attempts to curb consumer motivation in Calvinist
ideology, which denounced the most conspicuous forms of consumption as
a sinful practice. According to this ideology, it was one's success in
practical activity that should be displayed, not personal wealth that
accrued to the individual as a result of his labor. And whatever resources
were left unused in personal consumption, were to be reinvested in
production, thereby maximizing the amount of divine grace that devolved
on a successful entrepreneur. [21]
Besides these parallels, there were fundamental differences between the
labor ethics championed by the socialist and Protestant ideologies. While
the former renounced private ownership, the latter appealed to personal
initiative firmly rooted in private property. Another point that formally
divided the two models concerned the manner in which the individual was
to be fully rewarded for his efforts: the socialist ideology promised a state
of bliss in this world as soon as the full-blown communism comes into its
own, while Protestant teaching saw salvation fully attainable only in the
world to come. Given a somewhat uncertain time frame within which fullblown communism was to be expected, the socialist promise tended to
recede into an indefinite future and thus was to be redeemed only for the
"generations to come."
As we can see, Protestant ethics and socialist labor morality helped
motivate labor during the early stages of capital accumulation, with the
Protestant model accentuating personal efforts on the basis of private
property and the socialist model stressing individual efforts on the basis of
state ownership as the surest path towards rapid industrialization in the
Soviet Union . However, if the Protestant work ethic gave rise to the
"spirit of capitalism" and spurred economic growth in the West, secular
socialist ideology failed to generate the "spirit of communism" and to
furnish the foundation for sustained economic growth in the socialist East.
BEYOND THE SOCIALIST LABOR MORALITY
The fundamental cultural and economic changes that shook Soviet society
in the late 1980's and that continue to unfold at present could not but
affect labor morality. Let us now turn to the new developments in Russian
labor culture. In addition to the normative and ideological blueprints for
labor ethics which preoccupied us in the previous section, we shall also
focus on the current trends in everyday labor culture as revealed in recent

sociological inquiries into labor motives and work ethics. We begin with
the changing employment patterns.
The Diversification of Normative Employment Patterns
Perhaps the most dramatic evidence that the dogmas of socialist
economics have lost their magic power was the legalization of private
enterprise. Suppressed and prosecuted for many decades, private
entrepreneurial activity was not reinstated overnight. The first movement
in this direction was the official blessing that Mikhail Gorbachev bestowed
on cooperative enterprises. Private enterprise was further strengthened by
the law on "Enterprises and Entrepreneurship" passed by the Russian
Parliament, which among other things spelled out the entrepreneurial
rights. [22] The Constitution adopted by the Russian Federation during the
December '93 national referendum stipulated that "every person has the
right to use freely his abilities and property to engage in entrepreneurial
and other economic activities unrestricted by law." [23]
As to public opinion, its growing acceptance of entrepreneurship is
reflected in the polls, which point to an increasing number of individuals
wishing to start their own businesses. The figures are impressive, even if
it is clear that some respondents are unprepared to follow through on
their expressed wishes. For example, the October 1990 opinion survey
probed the Soviet urban population's interest in various kinds of
businesses and the production means they would like to obtain. The poll
listed common businesses like shops, restaurants, service outlets, etc. The
results pointed to a significant number of individuals who wanted to open
up their own business, even though no opportunity might exist for this in
the present: a third of Russian citizens living in urban areas expressed an
interest in starting their own business. And this was before the massive
push toward privatization in post-Gorbachev Russia . The numbers were
even more impressive in other republics of the former Soviet Union : 43%
in the Ukraine , and over 50% in Armenia , Moldova , Georgia and
Lithuania. [24] A poll conducted a year later showed that fully 20% of
Moscow high school graduates would like to open up a private business.
[25]
Entrepreneurial activity was even less threatening and unheard of to the
farmers. Since the early 30s, Soviet agriculture entailed two sectors: the
public/collective sector which absorbed most of the arable lands in the
nation and the private one, comprised by the small plots assigned to
farmers and their families for private use. While the private sector
included a fraction of the nation's lands used in agriculture, it accounted

for half of all potatoes and one third of eggs and meat sold in the Soviet
Union during recent decades. Clearly, we are dealing here with private
business based on the labor of farmers and their family members, a
rudimentary capitalist sector which, in spite of adverse conditions, existed
throughout the Soviet era and continues to flourish today. [26]
Private enterprise needs both an entrepreneur and hired labor. During the
early perestroika years, Socialist ideologists sneered at free enterprise
because it would restore the "exploitation" of hired labor allegedly absent
under socialism, a system supposedly incompatible with work for hire.
Contrary to such sentiments, the urban majority in Russia and other
Soviet republics supported hired labor. By the end of 1990, the
opportunity to work for a private owner was endorsed by most people in
the Soviet Union , except for respondents in Turkmenia , Kirghizia , and
Kazakhstan . The three Baltic republics, along with Armenia and Ukraine ,
registered the biggest majorities favoring this type of employment.
[27] Moreover, as recent studies show, employment at a private
enterprise is now a more attractive option than work at a state-owned
outlet. [28]
All these changes in the legal environment and public opinion led to the
rapid growth of new employment patterns. The statistical data shows that
by early 1993, sixteen million people in the Russian Federation were
employed in new enterprises, almost all of these privately owned.
[29] Judged by self-reports, 30 percent of those employed claim that they
are engaged in profit-oriented activities, including 8 percent who consider
themselves enterprise co-owners with a voice in the decision making
process and 3 percent -- sole enterprise owners. [30] Taken together,
these findings clearly suggest that public opinion in Russia has endorsed
employment at non-state enterprises.
Another interesting feature pertaining to the employment situation in
Russia is the proliferation of secondary employment that allows the
individual to supplement income from a primary job. As we saw above,
this phenomenon was widely spread in the rural areas, where work on
one's private plot constituted secondary employment. Now the multiple
employment pattern, once denounced by the Soviet authorities, is
beginning to spread in the cities, especially the big ones. In November of
1993, 40 percent of the adult male population in big cities had two or
more jobs. [31] To be sure, many people are forced to seek secondary
employment to supplement their meager incomes eaten up by relentless
inflation. At the same time, a person is more independent from any single
employer when he holds several jobs and for the first time feels that he

indeed owns his labor power, skills, and abilities. Thus a genuine
mobilization of labor resources is taking place in Russia , and this is not
just by drawing new workers into the economic process but through the
more intensive involvement of the seasoned and most active part of the
labor force.
We have examined some of the new employment opportunities sanctioned
by the Russian state and generally endorsed by public opinion. Alongside
these changes came the official recognition of unemployment, which for a
long time was decried as incompatible with socialism. The Employment Act
adopted by the Russian Parliament on April 19, 1991 , explicitly defined
the status of the unemployed, spelled out the procedures covering
unemployment registration, and outlined benefits that the unemployed
could receive from the state. [32]
Naturally, most Russian citizens are not thrilled at the prospect of losing
their and would like to see full employment guaranteed by the state.
However, if we are to judge from the polls, a substantial part of the
Russian population is growing accustomed to the grim reality of
joblessness and is beginning to adapt to such a possibility. [33] Several
million Russian workers have already had first-hand experience of being
unemployed.
Just a decade ago, such a situation would have seemed preposterous, as
the experts unanimously predicted labor shortage. This judgment, based
on the extrapolation of the past socio-economic trends into the future,
runs afoul of the radical changes that swept the country in the last few
years. [34]
These employment trends had their impact on labor discipline. A survey of
personnel managers at several large Moscow enterprises conducted in the
Summer of 1992 revealed that workers were reportedly growing more
disciplined and responsible -- a shift that personnel managers greeted
with approval and that could be attributed largely to the uncertain labor
market and increased likelihood of layoffs. [35] We can expect the
transition to a market economy and the sobering effect that
unemployment exerts on labor discipline to have a continuous impact on
labor ethics.
In addition to involuntary unemployment, we should mention an important
cultural change in public attitudes towards individuals who do not wish to
be involved in the labor process. Before perestroika, every able-bodied
Soviet citizen of working age was obligated to seek public employment.

But the Russian Federation Employment Act, adopted on April 19, 1991,
stipulates that "citizens possess the exclusive right to dispose of their
capacity for productive and creative labor. Coercive employment is
inadmissible with the exception of cases expressly stipulated by the law.
Non-employment should not give grounds for administrative or any other
liability." [36] This change is duly reflected in the current Russian
Constitution which no longer mentions employment as a duty, even
though it still stipulates the right to dispose freely of one's labor power, to
choose one's occupation, to obtain the remuneration for one's work
without any discrimination, and to be protected from unemployment.
One can hardly overestimate the importance of all these transformations
in the Russian labor law and labor morality. Labor is loosing its halo of
sacredness with which it appears in a socialist society. It is no longer seen
as an obligation rooted in the individual's responsibility to the state and is
increasingly conceived as a matter of personal choice. At the same time,
the new labor morality enriched employment patterns in the country and
encouraged entrepreneurial initiative. We can see this in the fact that
individuals began to feel themselves as real owners of their labor force.
They act less as state employees and more like sellers of their work force.
But this newly acquired taste for freedom confronted the Russian work
force with fresh problems and serious responsibilities that the market
economy brought in its wake.
The Current Trends in Labor Attitudes and Values
As we noticed above, Soviet society could never overcome the gap
between the official labor ethics that touted public good along with job
content as normative labor motives and the real motivation that propelled
Soviet workers, most of whom saw their labor as a means of furthering
their personal and family well-being. The breakdown of totalitarianism
effectively eliminates this contradiction. In the late 80s and early 90s, the
fundamental cultural shift took place, which legitimized personal interests
and private life. Fully rehabilitated were also material, bodily needs which
used to be denigrated as secondary and base compared to the higher
spiritual needs. The "base" bodily functions grow in importance and
become culturally at least as legitimate as the "lofty" spiritual ones.
[37] In the same perspective we should judge the parallel cultural
rehabilitation of personal wealth and private property, as well as the
vastly expanded access to real goods now legally available to individuals
and families.
Hence, it should come as no surprise that today, like in the 70s, private,

material interests workers' job motivation. Two surveys, one conducted in
1989 and the other in 1990, polled factory workers about jobs they would
have liked to perform. [38] The respondents were asked to choose any
number of required job characteristics from among seventeen possible job
features presented by the researchers. The responses indicate that the
majority of the individuals polled marked the items directly bearing on
their personal interests and their family's well-being. The opportunity for
good earnings topped the list, while the possibility to improve housing
conditions with the employer's help, to operate in a comfortable working
environment, to use reliable and safe industrial equipment, and to deal
with agreeable and likable co-workers closely followed. "Good earnings"
were singled out as important by 70% of all respondents, compared to 4344% of those polled who gave high rating to an "interesting job." This list
of leading personal motives combines the desire to maximize job
"rewards" and reduce to a minimum personal "costs" associated with poor
working conditions, faulty tools, and tension in the work place. This
finding is remarkably consistent with the world-wide trends detected by R.
Inglehart and his associates in the World Values Survey of more than
twenty countries, including Russia . The Russian survey conducted in the
beginning of 1991[39] showed that 80% of respondents marked "good
earnings" as an important job characteristic. If we compare these results
to the 1976 study, we can see that the Russian workers' values have
remained stable for at least two decades. The desire to earn more -- not
to labor for work's sake as a primary human need -- had motivated
Russian workers during this entire period. Very tangible are the changes in
the range and quality of goods and services that workers aspire to
purchase with their money. With the barrier to the free flow of information
coming down, the Russian population has developed consumption
expectations that are not dissimilar in principle from those commonly
found in the West. This increase in consumption (and consequently in
salary) expectations could be gleaned from the comparison between
expectations of the high school graduates' in 1985 and the early 90s: The
findings of this study, [40] which used such indicators as the desire to
own a car, private summer cottage, etc. Noteworthy is also the fact that
the growth in salary and consumption aspirations goes hand in hand with
the diminished willingness on the part of employees to expend a given
amount of their labor power in order to satisfy their aspirations. Thus the
above mentioned comparative study of adolescents revealed that in the
last few years, there was a noticeable drop in the willingness of young
people to face labor hardships (such as to work in cold climates, apart
from their families, in especially labor-intensive and monotonous job
settings, etc.).

Yuri Levada reports similar results. The two surveys, one conducted in
1988 and the other in 1992, asked Russian citizens the same question:
"What do you think is important to be successful in life?" During the four
years that elapsed between the first and second poll, the proportion of the
respondents who answered that the requirement for success was "hard
and deliberate work" dropped from 45 to 32 percent. [41] In light of these
findings, it is easier to understand why the desire to increase personal
earnings shares the top billing with the desire to minimize personal cost in
the hierarchy of job values of the contemporary Russian worker.
It is common to interpret the revolution of consumptive expectations and
the decline in the willingness to face work hardships as a sign of the
breakdown in moral values. But I think it would be more appropriate to
criticize past labor ethics which demanded hard work in exchange for few
tangible goods or for a mere reprieve from punishment. It is to mask the
absurdity of such a demand that the socialist labor morality goaded the
employees to enjoy the labor process itself and derive satisfaction from
the fact that they participate in the great adventure of building a
communist society. Given this history of labor morality in the Soviet Union
, the current aversion to hard work and sacrifices could be seen as an
understandable reaction to the traditional Soviet labor culture.
However, the unwillingness to expend personal effort should not be
overinterpreted. It should be judged against the backdrop of growing
multiple or secondary employment, which shows that Russian workers
want not so much to curtail their gross labor efforts and expenditures as
to decrease the relative weight of their personal labor efforts needed to
produce one item of output for a unit of pay. The current trends might be
described as the shift from the lower to higher cost-benefit ratio of the
individual's rewards to his/her costs. Hardly justified, therefore, are those
commentators who believe that "it is hard to lure a nation like Russia into
a chase for more money -- a more sublime goal is needed to get it going."
[42] Personal and family prosperity is rapidly turning into a sublime goal
that beckons the Russian labor force toward a better future.
Labor-Management Relations
As the official lies about the employees owning the production means have
been exposed, the hard-edged truths about wage labor for the state grew
more and more evident to the Russian workers. These truths might be
painful, but they also have a positive effect on labor, which takes stock of
its shared interests and sets out to defend them through their own labor
organizations -- independent trade unions, strike committees, workers'

councils, etc. [43] The turning point was the mass strikes by Soviet
miners in 1989. These strikes exploded the communist myths about labor
as a spiritual need and about the natural harmony prevailing in the labormanagement relations under socialism. After decades of submission,
Russian state employees moved to assert their group interests. [44]
The dynamics of attitudes toward ownership and industrial management
yield ample evidence that the labor force in Russia is not only conscious of
its group interests but also willing to act on them. We have mentioned
earlier the research on values which demonstrated the salaried workers'
central concern with good earnings and personal/family well-being. The
same study attempted to gauge the wage-earners' interest in comanaging their enterprises. The respondents were presented with several
options, ranging from the readiness to cede to the outside owners all
operational control over a given enterprise to the arrangement where the
employees own their enterprise and elect their own managers. More than
half of Russian respondents preferred an option where they could own
their enterprise collectively and appoint their managers. Among the
countries which participated in this international survey, this was by far
the highest figure. [45]
A closer analysis yields some further insight into the wage-earners'
preference for the participation in enterprise management. Among the
countries involved in this survey, the ex-socialist entities ( Poland , Russia
, Belorus , Latvia ) are the most committed to the scheme which involves
employees in the property ownership and management at their
enterprises. As we can see, even the cardinal change in the outlook on
ownership and property relations that has occurred in Russia in recent
years did not alter the salaried workers' preference for collective forms of
privatizing the nation's means of production.
Another sign that hired labor regards its own interests first and foremost
can be gleaned from the answer to the following question: "Some say that
one should follow instructions of one's superior even when one does not
fully agree with them. Others say that one should follow one's superior's
instructions only when one is convinced that they are right. With which of
these two options do you agree?" The answers included the following
options:
"Should follow instructions" (one point)
"First see if they are correct" (three points)

"[It] Depends" (two points)
The "insubordination index" compiled on the basis of these answers shows
that the Russian population scored the highest on their readiness to
second-guess and defy the managers' decisions. [46] Other ex-socialist
countries took the second place in their labor force's readiness to interfere
with the management decisions.
The high score that Russian respondents showed on the insubordination
scale supports Stark and Burawoy's studies in which the authors examined
the management patterns in socialist countries. According to Stark, who
studied Hungarian enterprises, the socialist economy combines centralized
planning at the national economic level with the market-style haggling
between workers and managers at the shop-floor level. [47] Burawoy,
who worked at a Russian factory for several months, was amazed at the
extent to which the actual labor process under socialism had diverged
from the official prescriptions: "From a capitalist perspective it is difficult
to understand how such anarchy in production could lead to an enterprise
as successful as Polar Furniture. The secret of the capitalist enterprise lies
in the managerial control over production, a control entirely absent at
Polar [the Russian factory name]." [48]
After decades of neglect suffered from their communist bosses, members
of the ex-socialist labor force want to assert their dignity and human
rights. They resent the political and trade union leaders who
misrepresented their interests in the past, they are fed up with the
situation when they are extolled to work hard for a token remuneration,
and they are contemptuous of their incompetent bosses. Given these
long-standing grievances, one can understand why workers might be
trying to carry out their newly found democratic freedoms into the
economic sphere. Yet, like workers in capitalist countries, they may have
to learn to live with democratic institutions in the political sphere and the
autocratic management practices prevalent in a capitalist economy. [49]
Conclusion: Towards a Post-Soviet Labor Ethic
In this chapter, I have tried to show that socialism created its own labor
culture, which included specific labor values and labor morality. This labor
morality successfully functioned as a mobilizing device during the period
of forced industrialization but gradually lost its legitimacy and yielded to
unofficial norms that markedly differed from the orthodox doctrine. These
changes laid a motivational groundwork for a market economy, which
appeared on the micro level way before the macro-social framework for

market economy was in place. What this means, among other things, is
that the transformation of the socialist system into a market economy has
deep roots in the consciousness of Russian people and is not something
artificially imposed on it from without.
The anti-totalitarian revolution brought in its wake a new labor culture
which is based on private property on the production assets and, even
more importantly, on the real ownership of the individual over his labor
force, including his freedom to dispose of it as he sees fit. At the head of
the new labor culture is the consumer interests of the worker and his
family. Its other relevant component is the close attention that salaried
workers pay to the cost-benefit ratio of their work. This norm, which is
now being extended to other economic resources besides labor, is akin to
personal thriftiness that played such a central role at the dawn of Western
capitalism as an element of the protestant ethic.
The new labor morality requires proper ideology to back it up. Fully
legitimized labor norms, in turn, could help mobilize labor in the postSoviet market place. Whether Russia can pull from its present economic
crisis and evolve into a prosperous society depends in large measure on
the success of this process.
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